South Carolina Law Review
Volume 37
Issue 1 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SOUTH CAROLINA
LAW

Article 12

Fall 1985

Practice and Procedure

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
(1985) "Practice and Procedure," South Carolina Law Review: Vol. 37 : Iss. 1 , Article 12.
Available at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol37/iss1/12

This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please
contact digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

et al.: Practice and Procedure

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
I.

MUTUALITY

No

LONGER REQUIRED FOR OFFENSIVE

COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL

In Beall v. Doe' the South Carolina Court of Appeals permitted the respondent to collaterally estop2 the appellant from
relitigating the issue of the identity of the driver of an automobile even though the respondent was not a party to the original

action. This use of offensive collateral estoppel, 3 despite the lack
of mutuality, 4 pushes South Carolina ahead of many jurisdictions that still uphold the mutuality rule.
Respondent Beall was operating a motor vehicle owned by
his passenger, Margaret Sheppard. Before making a turn, the
automobile was struck from behind by an auto owned by appellant Conerly. After the accident, the driver of the Conerly vehicle abandoned the automobile and fled the scene of the accident.
Afterward Beall and Sheppard filed separate actions under the

1. 281 S.C. 363, 315 S.E.2d 186 (Ct. App. 1984).
2. Collateral estoppel or issue preclusion is the doctrine that bars a party from relitigating a particular issue he has already litigated in a prior action. BLACK'S LAW DiCTIONARY 237, 746 (5th ed. 1979). Res judicata is the doctrine that a final judgment rendered
by the court is conclusive as to the right of the parties and acts as a bar to a subsequent
action involving the same cause of action. Id. at 1175. See also 281 S.C. at 369 n.1, 315
S.E.2d at 186 n.1; 1B J. MOORE, T. LUCAS & T. CuRREER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTCE 11
0.405[1], 0.441[1] (2d ed. 1983). For a full discussion of collateral estoppel and res judicata in South Carolina, see Stewart, Res Judicata and CollateralEstoppel in South
Carolina, 28 S.C.L. REv. 451 (1977).
3. "[O]ffensive use of collateral estoppel occurs when the plaintiff seeks to foreclose
the defendant from relitigating an issue the defendant has previously litigated unsuccessfully in an action with another party. Defensive use occurs when a defendant seeks to
prevent a plaintiff from asserting a claim the plaintiff has previously litigated and lost
against another defendant." Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 n.4, 326 n.4
(1979).
4. The mutuality doctrine prohibits a person not a party or privy to a party to the
prior litigation from pleading the judgment as collateral estoppel. The modern trend has
been to abandon the mutuality doctrine and determine whether to use collateral estoppel
on a case by case basis. 1B MOORE, supra note 2, 10.412. See also infra text accompanying note 23.
5. For a partial listing of jurisdictions that have and have not retained the mutuality
rule, see RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS § 529 reporter's note (1982)(six jurisdictions still adhering to the rule and eleven abolishing the mutuality requirement).
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Financial Responsibility Acts against both Conerly and John
Doe.7 Before any of these cases reached trial, Beall and Sheppard were married.8 Sheppard's case reached trial first. The trial
was attended by Conerly's attorney, but not by Conerly himself,
whose deposition was published at trial.9 The jury returned a
verdict for Sheppard against Conerly, which was not appealed.' °
Two months later the Beall case reached trial. The trial
judge held that the judicial determination in the first trial that
Conerly was the operator of the automobile precluded a John
Doe action 1 ' and collaterally estopped Conerly from denying
that he was the driver at the time of the accident.' 2 The court of
appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling.
In affirming the trial court, the court of appeals rejected
Conerly's contention that collateral estoppel, especially when asserted offensively, required mutuality of parties.' 3 The court
cited a series of cases to show that South Carolina has long rec-4
ognized estoppel by judgment on the ground of public policy.'

6. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 56-9-850 to -860 (1976).

7. 281 S.C. at 365, 315 S.E.2d at 187.
8. Brief of Respondent at 6, Record at 36.
9. 281 S.C. at 366, 316 S.E.2d at 188. The deposition was taken by the attorney for
John Doe. No motion for a continuance based on Conerly's absence was made by
Conerly's attorney. Record at 36.
10. 281 S.C. at 366, 315 S.E.2d at 188.
11. Record at 38.
12. Id. at 39. In precluding the relitigation of the driver's identity, the trial judge
relied on third party conduct that induces reliance on an adjudication. See RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS § 111 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977). Comment a. of § 111 states:
"[A] person who is not a party to an action may be precluded by the judgment in an
action when he is involved with it in a way that falls short of becoming a party but which
justly should result in his being denied opportunity to relitigate the matters previously
in issue."

Sheppard and BeaU were married prior to the first trial. At that trial both respondent and his wife sat at the same table with counsel and were represented by the same
lawyer in their respective actions. Respondent Beall gave testimony in the first trial of
his wife's claim and his lawyer conducted the proof of the identity of the driver. In the
second trial, brought by respondent, Beall was held to have "had this day in court" and
was denied the opportunity to relitigate the issue of the driver's identity. Record at 43.
The trial judge judiciously and appropriately avoided the issue of the use of offensive
collateral estoppel in his opinion.
13. 281 S.C. at 367, 316 S.E.2d at 189.
14. Id. The court cited the following cases: Mackey v. Frazier, 234 S.C. 81, 106
S.E.2d 895 (1959); Watson v. Goldsmith, 705 S.C. 215, 31 S.E.2d 317 (1944); Jenkins v.
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 89 S.C. 408, 71 S.E. 1010 (1910). All three opinions created
exceptions to the privity requirement. For a full discussion, see Practiceand Procedure,
Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, 35 S.C.L. REv. 107, 109 (1983).
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The court further observed that the South Carolina Supreme
Court, in Graham v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co.,'1 had
held that nonmutuality or the "lack of privity" would not prevent the defensive use of collateral estoppel when the party "adversely affected had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the
relevant issues effectively in the prior action."'16
The South Carolina Court of Appeals rejected the position
advanced by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Watkins v.
M&M Tank Lines.'7 In Watkins the Fourth Circuit, relying on
Preisterv. Southern Railway,"" reversed the United States District Court's holding that South Carolina law granted a nonmutual plaintiff the use of offensive collateral estoppel to preclude the relitigation of an issue decided adversely to the

15. 277 S.C. 389, 287 S.E.2d 495 (1982).
16. Id. at 390, 287 S.E.2d at 496. The South Carolina Supreme Court noted that
estoppel had been recognized under certain situations. See supra text accompanying
note 14. The court maintained, however, that the modem trend is to disregard the privity requirement in applying estoppel by judgment. Graham appears to have been less a
legal analysis than a decision to move the state away from archaic legal concepts. This
modern trend has been upheld in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
See infra text accompanying note 23. The United States Supreme Court has maintained
that it is a violation of due process to bind a litigant not a party or a privy in a previous
action since there was never the opportunity to be heard. Id. at 327 n.7. Due process
affords all litigants the right to a fair trial and the opportunity to present their evidence
and arguments on a claim. See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill.
Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1979).
17. 694 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1982). Appellee Watkins was injured in an accident when
a tractor trailer, owned by appellant M & M, collided with the automobile he was driving. Appellee's wife brought suit in state court for loss of consortium and won. Appellee
then brought an action against the same defendant in the United States District Court
for personal injuries suffered in the accident, asserting that collateral estoppel precluded
the relitigation of the issue of M & M's liability. The district court upheld appellee's
contention and precluded relitigation of the liability issue.
18. 151 S.C. 433, 149 S.E. 266 (1929). In Preisterplaintiff's wife originally brought
an action in the United States District Court for damages for personal injuries suffered
when the automobile in which she was riding collided with defendants' train. In that
action the court found the defendant not liable. The plaintiff later brought a state court
action for damages for loss of consortium. The court held for the plaintiff over the defendants' exceptions that a directed verdict should have been entered for the defendants
since the issue of the defendants' negligence had already been decided in favor of the
defendants in the first action. The South Carolina Supreme Court held that "[t]he
causes of action in the two cases are entirely different and distinct, and the judgment in
favor of the defendants in an action on one is not a bar to an action on the other." 151
S.C. at 436, 149 S.E.2d at 227. Cf. Gillespie v. Ford, 222 S.C. 46, 71 S.E.2d 596 (1952);
Hiott v. Contracting Servs., 276 S.C. 632, 281 S.E.2d 224 (1981)(both cases affirming
Preister).
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defendant in a previous action. 19 The South Carolina Court of
Appeals agreed with the district court's contention that the real
issue in Preisterwas whether res judicata2 ° barred the plaintiff's
action and not whether collateral estoppel barred relitigation of
the liability issue.2 ' In light of Graham, the Fourth Circuit in
Watkins should have addressed whether the party adversely affected had a "full and fair opportunity to litigate" the issue in
the prior action.2 2
This "full and fair opportunity to litigate" has become the
watchword since the United States Supreme Court conditionally
approved the doctrine of nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel
in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore.25 In Beall the South Carolina
Court of Appeals noted the policies favoring application of this
doctrine. The doctrine helps 1) bar subsequent litigation of an
issue that a defendant has already thoroughly and vigorously litigated, 2) put an end to litigation of the same issue for the public interest, and 3) decrease the case burden on an already overworked judiciary since a party is estopped from relitigating
issues previously decided in prior suits.2 4 South Carolina's application of the doctrine satisfies the "full and fair" standard since
"[a] statement or finding in a case is not considered an adjudication unless it is clearly shown to have been a basis for the judgment. ' 25 As the standard for asserting the doctrine of nonmutual
collateral estoppel, the court of appeals adopted the rule formulated by the American Law Institute. 6
Whether this now permissible form of collateral estoppel

19. 694 F.2d at 311.
20. Res judicata is defined and distinguished from collateral estoppel supra note 2.
21. 281 S.C. at 369, 315 S.E.2d at 189.
22. The Fourth Circuit had the benefit of Graham and recognized that collateral
estoppel could be asserted when the party had a "full and fair opportunity to litigate."
694 F.2d at 311.
23. 439 U.S. 322 (1979). In Parklane the Supreme Court extended the holding of
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Mll. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1970)(allowing nonmutual defensive collateral estoppel) to the use of nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel. Id. at 328. But see United States v. Mendoza, 104 S.Ct. 568 (1984)(nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel is not available to plaintiffs in actions against the
United States Government).
24. 281 S.C. at 370, 315 S.E.2d at 190 (quoting Hassler v. Barry, 403 A.2d 762, 769
(Me. 1979)).
25. Lowe v. Clayton, 264 S.C. 75, 85, 212 S.E.2d 582, 587 (1975).
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JuDG~MNTs § 29 (1982). The standard set forth there
reflects the requirements announced in Parklane.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol37/iss1/12

4

1985]

et al.: Practice
Procedure
PRACTICE
AND and
PROCEDURE

will be beneficial to the state of South Carolina has yet to be
determined. Both courts and commentators have criticized nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel, charging that it increases
the extent of the litigation in the original suit;2 7 impedes the

speedy disposition of smaller claims, adds more jury trials, and
increases the number of appeals in order to avoid the consequences of adverse judgments; 28 and discourages the original
consolidation of actions by allowing potential plaintiffs to adopt
a "wait and see" attitude, thus increasing litigation.29 Finally, as
Professor Currie's classical "Problem" demonstrates,"0 application of nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel could generate
absurdly inconsistent judgments.3 1
Only time will tell whether South Carolina will benefit from
the doctrine's use. The negative commentary, however, is extensive and illustrates the dangers inherent in the doctrine. A tactical error on an attorney's part or a slightly biased jury could
spell disaster since the issues decided adversely against the litigant are "frozen" and can be used as a sword against him in
subsequent litigation. The doctrine will force litigants to fight it
out to the end in any initial suit in order to protect their interests, creating longer and more complex trial suits. Careful judicial control must be exercised to prevent potential abuse of this
doctrine.
Richard K. Warther

27. R. FIELD & B. KAPLAN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 859 (3d ed. 1973); Moore & Currier,
Mutuality and Conclusiveness of Judgments, 35 TuL. L. REV. 301, 309 (1961); Comment,
23 OR. L. REv. 273, 279-80 (1944).
28. Nevarox v. Caldwell, 161 Colo. App. 2d 762, 327 P.2d 111 (1958); Reardon v.
Allen, 88 N.J. Super. 560, 572, 213 A.2d 26, 32 (1965).
29. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 330.
30. See Currie, Mutuality of Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L.
REV. 281 (1957).

31. Id. at 281-86. Currie presents the problem of limitless application of nonmutual
offensive collateral estoppel. For example, 50 people are injured on an express train collision. All 50 people bring separate suits in various courts against the railroad for damages
based on the defendant's negligence. In the first 25 suits, all the plaintiffs fail to establish the defendant's negligence, but the 26th passenger wins. Due process prevents the
defendant from using a favorable judgment against each new plaintiff, but due process
does not prevent a nonparty from estopping a defendant who has had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate. With the limitless application of nonmutual offensive collateral
estoppel, the remaining plaintiffs can use the 26th judgment to preclude relitigation of
the issue by the defendants.

Published by Scholar Commons, 1985

5

South
Carolina
Law Review,
Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [1985], Art.[Vol.
12 37
SOUTH
CAROLINA
LAW REVIEW

II.

VALIDITY OF

Two ISSUE RULE

AFFIRMED

In two recent cases, Gasque v. Heublein, Inc.32 and Thomas
v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc.,33 the South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the validity of the "two issue rule ' 34 in South
Carolina. In both cases two theories of liability were submitted
to the jury, and general verdicts3 5 in favor of the plaintiffs were
returned. The defendants did not object to the form of the verdict in either case.
Courts have expressed conflicting views on whether a general verdict must be set aside when there is prejudicial error affecting one of the grounds of action or defense. Some jurisdictions hold that the verdict must be set aside since it is
impossible to determine which issues or defenses the jury relied
on in reaching its verdict.36 Other jurisdictions, applying the
"two issue rule," have held that if there is one cause of action or
count which has no material error, errors associated with a different cause of action should be disregarded since one cause of
action or defense, sustained by sufficient evidence and free from
error, is enough to uphold the verdict.3 7 South Carolina follows
the latter rule.38
Gasque filed a product liability action against Heublein, Inc.
after the stopper and cork assembly manufactured by the defendant ejected prematurely from a champagne bottle.3 9 Two theo-

32. 281 S.C. 278, 315 S.E.2d 556 (Ct. App. 1984).
33. 282 S.C. 267, 317 S.E.2d 768 (Ct. App. 1984).

34. Under the "two issue rule":
When there are several issues in the case submitted to a jury under full
instructions, a general verdict in favor of one or the other of the parties, in the
absence of objection to the verdict not having passed upon the several issues
separately, will be held to have concluded all the issues.
Hussman Refrigerator & Supply Co. v. Cash & Carry Grocer, Inc., 134 S.C. 191, 196, 132
S.E. 173, 174 (1926).
35. In a general verdict the jury finds for plaintiff or defendant in general terms.
The jury pronounces generally upon any or all of the issues either in favor of the plaintiff
or defendant. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1399 (5th ed. 1977).
36. See, e.g., Peterson v. Rodekuhr, 274 Minn. 204, 143 N.W.2d 226 (1966); Heinen
v. Heinen, 64 Nev. 527, 186 P.2d 770 (1947).
37. See, e.g., Reese v. Cradit, 12 Ariz. App. 233, 469 P.2d 467 (1970); Berger v.
App.
Southern Pac. Co., 144 Cal. App. 2d 1, 300 P.2d 170 (1956); Roth v. Meeker, 72 Ill.
3d 66, 389 N.E.2d 1248 (1979); Watson v. Long, 221 S.W.2d 967 (Mo. App. 1949).
38. See, e.g., Anderson v. West, 270 S.C. 184, 241 S.E.2d 551 (1978); Hussman Refrigerator & Supply Co. v. Cash & Carry Grocer, Inc., 134 S.C. 191, 132 S.E. 173 (1926).
39. 281 S.C. at 281, 315 S.E.2d at 558. Joined with Heublein, Inc. as defendants
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1985]

ries of liability were submitted to the jury: negligence and strict
liability in tort.40 Heublein, however, never made motions to require the plaintiff to elect between remedies or for a special verdict, and the jury returned a general verdict against Heublein. 4 1
Heublein appealed on the following three grounds: (1) error
in submission to the jury of the issues of negligent design, manufacture, inspection, and warning; (2) error in the admission of

certain evidence; and (3) error in the trial court's refusal to
grant Heublein's motion for a new trial because of a verdict actuated by passion, prejudice, and caprice.4 2 Heublein did not
brief any of its exceptions to the theory of strict liability and
conceded in the conclusions of its brief that the absence of negligence would not be fatal to the strict liability action. The unbriefed exceptions were deemed abandoned and the "two issue
rule" controlled. 4 The court of appeals rejected Heublein's contention that the theories of negligence and strict liability in tort

are so closely intertwined that the "two issue rule" was inapplicable, 44 and upheld the verdict pursuant to the "two issue
rule.

'4 5

In Thomas the action against Jim Walter Homes, Inc. was
for breach of a home construction contract. The complaint was
amended without objection during trial to include a cause of action for breach of implied warranty of habitability.46 The jury

were Heublein Allied Vintners, Inc. and United Vintners, Inc., the manufacturers and
bottlers of Jacques Bonet Cold Duck. Record at 1.
40. In his complaint plaintiff had sought recovery on the following three theories:
(1) negligence, (2) warranty, and (3) strict liability in tort. The warranty theory was not
submitted to the jury.
41. 281 S.C. at 281, 315 S.E.2d at 558.
42. Id. Although the case was decided on the basis of the "two issue rule," the court
examined and rejected each of the defendant's allegations of error.
43. 281 S.C. at 281-82, 315 S.E.2d at 558. Brief of Appellant at 45.
44. 281 S.C. at 282, 315 S.E.2d at 558. Heublein, relying on Claytor v. General Motors Corp., 277 S.C. 259, 286 S.E.2d 128 (1982), argued that identical proof was required
under the theories of negligent design, manufacture, and failure to warn and the strict
liability theories of defective design, defective manufacture, and failure to warn. Thus,
the "two issue rule" would not apply since the negligent action was not distinct from the
strict liability action. Heublein contended that prejudicial error on the negligence action
tainted the intertwined strict liability claim. Supplemental Brief of Appellant at 2. The
court rejected this claim noting that negligence and strict liability are distinct theories of
recovery in South Carolina, each requiring a different quantum of proof and having different origins, one statutory, the other common law. 281 S.C. at 282, 315 S.E.2d at 558.
45. Id.
46. 282 S.C. at 268, 317 S.E.2d at 769.
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returned a general verdict in favor of Thomas.47
One of the issues appealed by Jim Walter was whether the
trial judge erred in amending the complaint to include a cause of
action for breach of implied warranty of habitability. The majority held that an objection to the amendment of a complaint
could not be raised for the first time on appeal.48 In his concurring opinion, Judge Goolsby noted that even if the timing of the
objection were appropriate and the trial judge erred in allowing
the amendment, the "two issue rule" should, nevertheless, apply
because the jury had returned a general verdict after consideration of two issues, the contract and implied warranty of habitability. Since the verdict was supported on at least one theory,
the verdict could not be reversed on appeal.4 9
Both Gasque and Thomas clarify the existing state of law in
South Carolina. The "two issue rule" is well established in this
state and will continue to be applied by the courts.
Richard K. Warther
III.

TRIAL JUDGE'S DISCRETION IN DISALLOWING PRESENTATION
OF DEFENDANT'S WITNESSES UPHELD

In Moran v. Jones5" the South Carolina Court of Appeals
held that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing
to allow the defendant to present his witnesses at trial. The
court found that the defendant's failure to answer plaintiff's interrogatories requesting the names and addresses of all persons
to be called as witnesses, pursuant to Circuit Court Rule 90,51
justified the trial judge's action. The exclusion of witnesses at
trial is a harsh sanction that is rarely invoked by trial judges.
The action was commenced by respondent Moran for injuries sustained when he was struck crossing an intersection by a
47. Id.; Record at 4.
48. 282 S.C. at 270, 317 S.E.2d at 770. See also Cudd v. John Hancock Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 279 S.C. 623, 310 S.E.2d 830 (Ct. App. 1983).
49. 282 S.C. at 272, 317 S.E.2d at 771.
50. 281 S.C. 270, 315 S.E.2d 136 (Ct. App. 1984).
51. S.C. CIR. CT. P.R. 90(e)(1) states in pertinent part: "The standard interrogatories
which may be served by one party upon another are limited to the following: 1. Give the
names and addresses of persons known to the parties or counsel to be witnesses concerning the facts of the case . .. ."
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car driven by appellant Jones. The jury returned a verdict for
Moran, and Jones appealed.
Moran filed his complaint in June 1980 and in September
served Jones with interrogatories requesting the names and addresses of all persons Jones or his counsel knew to be witnesses.
Service was acknowledged, but Jones did not respond to the interrogatories. In October Moran moved for an order to compel
Jones to answer.5 2 This motion was granted, and in March 1981
Judge William Howell signed an order compelling Jones to answer. Later that month the trial judge issued a standing order to
counsel to present the court with pretrial briefs and a list of witnesses. Moran complied with this order; Jones complied with
neither order.
On the first day of trial Jones' attorney presented Moran's
counsel with a list of witnesses. Moran's counsel moved to exclude the witnesses, and the trial judge granted the motion because of Jones' failure to comply with Rule 90 and the two court
orders. Jones alleged on appeal that the trial judge abused his
discretion in refusing to allow the witnesses to testify at trial.
a
The court of appeals, while noting that "[e]xclusion of 53
witness is a sanction which should never be lightly invoked,
nevertheless stated that "the question of what sanctions, if any,
are to be imposed for failure to comply with Rule 90 is left
largely to the discretion of the trial judge. ' 54 The court stated
that in accordance with established case law, "[t]he appropriateness of a sanction is determined by such factors as the precise
nature of the interrogatories and discovery posture of the case,
willfulness, and degree of prejudice." 55 The court seemed particularly influenced by Jones' wilfulness in failing to comply with
Rule 90 and the two court orders.5 6

52. S.C. Cm. CT. P.R. 90(f) states in pertinent part: "If a party fails to respond to
interrogatories propounded under this rule, the party seeking discovery may apply to the
Court for an order compelling compliance therewith."
53. 281 S.C. at 276, 315 S.E.2d at 139 (citing Kirkland v. Peoples Gas Co., 269 S.C.
431, 237 S.E.2d 772 (1977)).
54. 281 S.C. at 276, 315 S.E.2d at 139.
55. Id. (citing Reed v. Clark, 277 S.C. 310, 286 S.E.2d 384 (1982); Laney v. Hefley,
262 S.C. 54, 202 S.E.2d 12 (1974)).
56. The court of appeals stated: "None of the six cases... decided to date by our
Supreme Court have presented evidence of willfulness equivalent to that of the instant
case. The trial judge justifiably found Jones' failure to comply with Rule 90 and the two
court orders was willful." 281 S.C. at 276, 315 S.E.2d at 139-40.
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The court also noted that the trial court had met its burden
under Laney v. Hefley 57 "by inquiring into the matter outside
the presence of the jury before determining that the importance
of the testimony that would have been given by Jones' excluded
witnesses did not outweigh the surprise to Moran and the need
to comply with the rule.""8 The trial judge's inquiry revealed
that Jones planned to call three witnesses: an EMS employee
who would testify he noticed the odor of alcohol on Moran; an
anesthesiologist who would testify he observed the odor of alcohol on Moran when he was admitted to the hospital; and one of
the physicians who treated Moran and would testify to Moran's
history of alcohol use and seizures, which may have been caused
by alcohol withdrawal. The trial judge, in making his determination to exclude the witnesses, noted that testimony regarding
Moran's use of alcohol had been given by another physician and
that none of the proposed witnesses could testify that Moran
was actually under the influence of alcohol when they observed
him.5 9

While the exclusion of witnesses is a harsh sanction for failure to comply with interrogatories, it appears to be particularly
warranted in this case because of counsel's failure to respond to
two court orders compelling the disclosure of witnesses. It
should be noted, however, that four of the six South Carolina
Supreme Court decisions addressing the issue have upheld the
trial judge's discretion in allowing witnesses to testify despite
noncompliance with Rule 90. In those four cases the trial courts
determined that the opposing party was not prejudiced by the
admission of the witnesses' testimony, despite noncompliance
with Rule 90, because the opposing counsel knew or should have
known of the witness' existence, knew of the substance of the
testimony offered, or did not immediately object when the offering party informed the court of his intention to call the witness.60 Practitioners should be aware that these factors will be

57. 262 S.C. 54, 202 S.E.2d 12 (1974).

58. 281 S.C. at 276, 315 S.E.2d at 140. It should be noted that while the trial judge
applied the procedure dictated by Laney, he reached a different conclusion. For the reasoning in Laney, see infra note 60.

59. 281 S.C. at 274, 315 S.E.2d at 138-39.
60. See Kirkland v. Peoples Gas Co., 269 S.C. 431, 237 S.E.2d 772 (1977)(expert
witness allowed to testify despite noncompliance with Rule 90 because opposing party
had a copy of the witness' report, had interviewed the witness before trial, and had him
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considered by the trial judge in deciding whether to invoke the
exclusion sanction. Since the trial courts' decisions have been affirmed in every case on this issue, practitioners should also be
aware that a reviewing court is likely to defer to the trial judge's
discretionary decision on the witness exclusion sanction.
Elizabeth W. Settle
IV.

EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL MAY

BAR

STATUTE OF FRAUDS

DEFENSE

In Atlantic Wholesale Co. v. Solondz61 the South Carolina
Court of Appeals held that the doctrine of estoppel may be invoked to bar the defense of the statute of frauds if the party
asserting the estoppel shows
it has suffered a detriment in reli62
ance on the oral contract.

On January 23, 1980, defendant Solondz, a New York resident, placed a telephone order to Atlantic Wholesale (Atlantic),
a South Carolina corporation, for 300 ounces of silver.6 Atlantic
purchased the silver and, upon receipt, placed it in its vault
pending payment from Solondz. On January 28, 1980, however,
after Solondz had placed the order, the price of silver began to
plummet. As a result, Solondz refused to pay for the silver, and
Atlantic was forced to sell the silver at a lower market price,
sustaining a loss of $8,328.64

Atlantic filed suit against Solondz for breach of contract,
listed as one of its own witnesses); Martin v. Dunlap, 266 S.C. 230, 222 S.E.2d 8
(1976)(witness allowed to testify despite noncompliance with Rule 90, because opposing
party knew of the existence of records to which the witness testified); Jackson v. H & S
Oil Co., 263 S.C. 407, 211 S.E.2d 223 (1975)(witness, accidently omitted from list of prospective witnesses prior to trial, allowed to testify because opposing party did not immediately object when informed that the witness would be called); Laney v. Hefley, 262 S.C.
54, 202 S.E.2d 12 (1974)(witness not listed in the answer to interrogatories allowed to
testify because opposing counsel was aware of witness' presence at accident scene and,
thus, was not unfairly surprised).
61. 283 S.C. 36, 320 S.E.2d 720 (Ct. App. 1984).
62. Id. at 41-42, 320 S.E.2d at 723-24.
63. Id. at 39, 320 S.E.2d at 722-23. Atlantic's business methods were dictated by
market conditions. Because of constant price fluctuations, Atlantic used the telephone to
negotiate instant contracts and bind both parties to the quoted price. Record at 48. Unless the customer was physically present at Atlantic's office, a written contract was impracticable. Brief of Respondent at 8.
64. Id. at 39-40, 320 S.E.2d at 723.
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seeking damages for the loss it sustained by selling the silver on

the deflated market. e5 After an unsuccessful challenge of the
court's jurisdiction,"6 Solondz asserted that the contract was
within the statute of frauds and, therefore, unenforceable.6

7

A

jury found Solondz liable to Atlantic for $8,328.00, and the trial
judge denied his motions for a directed verdict, judgment non
obstante veredicto, and a new trial.6 8 The South Carolina Court
of Appeals held that Solondz was equitably estopped from asserting the defense of the statute of frauds, stating that "[w]hile
the authorities are in conflict as to whether equitable estoppel
may be invoked to bar the defense of the statute of frauds...,
the rule appears to be in South Carolina that estoppel may be so
used."' 9 The court further held that the doctrine could be applied in an action at law "despite the equitable origins of the
' 70
doctrine of estoppel. 1

The court held that two requirements must be met before
equitable estoppel can be used to bar the defense of the statute
of frauds. First, "there must be 'competent proof of the existence of the oral contract.'-71 The court found that the testimony on record adequately established the existence of the oral
contract.7 2
65. Id. at 37, 320 S.E.2d at 721. Atlantic proposed the following three theories on
which to enforce the contract: course of dealing, Brief of Respondent at 6-11; past performance, Id. at 13; and equitable estoppel, Id. at 11-13. The court of appeals, however,
relied only on equitable estoppel to reach its decision.
66. Solondz made a special appearance to contest jurisdiction, claiming that he had
insufficient contacts with South Carolina to be subject to the jurisdiction of its court.
The trial court, however, denied his motion to dismiss. Id. at 37, 320 S.E.2d at 721. The
court of appeals, applying S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-803(1)(g)(1976), affirmed the trial
court's personal jurisdiction. 283 S.C. at 37-39, 320 S.E.2d at 721-22.
67. Id. at 37, 320 S.E.2d at 721. Solondz based his defense on the statute of frauds
provision in § 36-2-201(1) of the South Carolina Code, which provides in relevant part:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract for the sale of
goods for the price of $500 or more is not enforceable by way of action or
defense unless there is some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for
sale has been made between the parties and signed by the party against whom
enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent or broker.
S.C, CODE ANN. § 36-2-201(1)(1976).
68. 283 S.C. at 37, 320 S.E.2d at 721.
69. 283 S.C. at 40-41, 320 S.E.2d at 723.
70. Id. at 41, 320 S.E.2d at 723-24.
71. Id. at 40, 320 S.E.2d at 723 (quoting 37 C.J.S. Frauds, Statute of §
246(b)(1976)).
72. 283 S.C. at 40, 320 S.E.2d at 723. Two employees of Atlantic testified concerning
the existence of the contract. In addition, Atlantic introduced a trade ticket into evi-
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The second requirement is a showing of detrimental reliance. The court of appeals quoted from its decision in Collins
Music Co. v. Cook, 3 in which the court had stated:
[T]he party asserting the estoppel must show that he has suffered a definite, substantial, detrimental change of position in
reliance on the contract, and that no remedy except enforcement of the bargain is adequate to restore his former position
It is not sufficient to show 7merely
that he has lost an expected
4
benefit under the contract.
The court concluded that Atlantic had met this requirement as
well. Atlantic had ordered and paid for the requested silver and
thus had changed its position in reliance on the contract. After
the market declined and Solondz refused to honor his commitment, Atlantic sustained a substantial loss when it sold the silver on the deflated market. As the court observed, this loss con'7 5
stituted a clear "detrimental change in position.
Atlantic Wholesale demonstrates that sellers in South Carolina can use the doctrine of equitable estoppel to enforce oral
contracts if they can show that they sustained a definite, substantial loss in reliance on the contract. If, as in Atlantic Wholesale, the market price drops below the price the seller paid for
the commodity, the buyer will be estopped from asserting the
statute of frauds to invalidate an oral contract. Equitable estoppel cannot be used, however, if the market price remains equal
to or higher than the price the seller paid, since the commodity
can still be sold without an actual loss and, therefore, the seller
can show no detrimental change of position. As the court observed, "It is not sufficient to show merely that he has lost an
expected benefit under the contract. 7 6 It should be noted that
the doctrine of equitable estoppel is not available to a buyer as a
means of enforcing an oral contract. If the price of the commodity remains stable or falls he will have lost nothing, since he

dence to establish the existence of the oral contract. Atlantic prepared trade tickets as a
matter of routine when orders were placed. They contained information concerning the
price and quantity of precious metals ordered, as well as the name of the customer who
placed the order. Record at 14-15.
73. 281 S.C. 580, 316 S.E.2d 418 (Ct. App. 1984).
74. Id. at 583, 316 S.E.2d at 420.
75. 283 S.C. at 41, 320 S.E.2d at 724.
76. 281 S.C. at 583, 316 S.E.2d at 420.
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could purchase it at an equal or lower price. If, on the other
hand, the price rises, the only loss would be expected profits,
which do not constitute an actual loss for the purpose of equitable estoppel.
William Thomas Causby

V.

WHEN INDEMNIFICATION OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND EXPENSES
WILL BE PERMITTED IN THIRD PARTY SUIT

In JKT Co. v. Hardwick7 7 the South Carolina Court of Appeals held that after a successful defense against a third party's
suit, an action for indemnification7 8 of attorney's fees and litigation expenses may be allowed "if it is clear that the would-be
indemnitee would have been entitled to indemnification if found
liable."7 9 The court found that although expenses of a party defending against the acts of another may be indemnified, expenses of a party defending against his own wrongful acts may
not.
The controversy in this case resulted from a defective roof.8 0
JKT Company, owner of the office building with the faulty roof,
sued Celotex Corporation, the manufacturer and seller of the
roofing materials; Easley Lumber Company, the general contractor; and Grady Hardwick, the roofing subcontractor. JKT alleged that Celotex had supplied defective roofing materials and
that Easley and Hardwick had negligently constructed the
roof."' Easley and Hardwick, relying on Addy v. Bolton, 2 filed
cross-complaints against Celotex seeking indemnification for any
liability they might incur."3

77. 284 S.C. 10, 325 S.E.2d 329 (Ct. App. 1984).
78. See generally W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 51 (5th ed. 1984).
79. 284 S.C. at 16, 325 S.E.2d at 333.
80. Record at 33. The suit was based on negligence and breach of express and implied warranties.
81. 284 S.C. at 11-12, 325 S.E.2d at 330. Hardwick, the subcontractor, was subsequently exonerated by the jury.
82. 257 S.C. 28, 183 S.E.2d 708 (1971).
83. The trial judge reserved the indemnification issue for himself. The jury returned
a general verdict against Celotex and Easley. On appeal, the supreme court reversed the
verdict against Easley, but affirmed against Celotex. Thus, Celotex was the only party
found liable to JKT. Easley and Hardwick subsequently renewed their cross-claims for
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In Addy the plaintiffs sued their landlord to recover damages for acts committed by the landlord's general contractor, not
by the landlord himself.8 4 Finding that a cause of action for indemnity existed, the supreme court stated that "where the duty
to indemnify is either implied by law or arises under contract,
and no personal fault of the indemnitee has joined in causing
the injury, reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in resisting the
claim indemnified against may be recovered as part of the damages and expenses. ' 5 Since the landlord did not contribute to
the injury, he was entitled to indemnification."" In Hardwick the
court of appeals concluded that the logical converse of Addy was
that "if the claim is not one for which a party could be 'indemnified against' if found liable, then the expenses of litigation 8in7
curred in defending the claim are not recoverable damages.
Unlike the landlord in Addy, Hardwick, Easley, and Celotex
were defending against their own alleged wrongs, not the wrongs
of another. If a judgment had been entered against either Easley
or Hardwick, neither would have been entitled to indemnification because they would have contributed to JKT's injury. Since
no cause of action would have existed had Hardwick and Easley
been found liable, no cause of action for indemnification existed
when they were exonerated. 8
Generally, the obligation to indemnify arises from a contract or is implied by law.8 9 Indemnity may be implied when one
party, through no fault of his own, must pay damages caused by
the wrongful acts of another.9 0 In South Carolina parties may be

indemnification from Celotex. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial judge awarded attorney's fees, costs, and expenses to both complainants. Celotex appealed. 284 S.C. at 12,
325 S.E.2d at 330-31.
84. The tenants sued the landlord and a general contractor for damage caused by
the general contractor as he made repairs to the building. Although the landlord was not
liable, he filed a cross-action against the general contractor for attorney's fees and costs
of the action. The supreme court, on appeal, reversed the trial judge's denial of the appellant's cross-action. 257 S.C. at 34, 183 S.E.2d at 709.
85. Id. at 34, 183 S.E.2d at 710.
86. If the landlord had been found liable, he would have been entitled to indemnification from the contractor. 284 S.C. at 16, 325 S.E.2d at 333.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. 42 C.J.S. Indemnity § 1 (1944).
90. Id. §§ 20-21. In South Carolina no indemnity exists among joint tortfeasors. 284
S.C. at 13, 325 S.E.2d at 331. See also Horton v. U.S., 622 F.2d 80 (4th Cir. 1980); Stuck
v. Pioneer Logging Mach., Inc., 279 S.C. 22, 301 S.E.2d 552 (1983); Adcox v. American
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indemnified for attorney's fees and litigation expenses even if
they have not been found liable and have not been paid any
damages." In Addy and Hardwick the test was whether the innocent party could be indemnified if found liable. The Hardwick

court indicated that indemnification will be permitted when responsibility is based on constructive, vicarious, derivative, or
technical liability.9 2 The court noted that allowing indemnifica-

tion in this case would enable all defendants who successfully
defend their own actions to be indemnified by codefendants who

are found liable.93 The court of appeals was unwilling to establish such an unprecedented rule.
Sylvia Ann Matthews

VI.

STANDARD FOR DETERMINING WHEN CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS
JUSTIFY CHANGE OF VENUE Is LEFT AMBIGUOUS

In Stewart v. Ben Arnold Co. 9 4 the South Carolina Supreme
Court considered a corporate defendant's appeal from a lower
court order denying its request for change of venue. 95 In a divided opinion, 6 the court held that the contract rights of the
appellant were not so "substantial and continuous" as to establish a property interest for venue in Beaufort County, even
though the appellant maintained agents and transacted substantial business there. 7 Because of the lack of agreement in the

Home Assurance Co., 258 S.C. 331, 188 S.E.2d 785 (1972).
91. 284 S.C. at 14, 325 S.E.2d at 331-32 (quoting Addy, 257 S.C. at 34, 183 S.E.2d at
710). In some jurisdictions, if the potential indemnitee is not liable to the original plaintiff, he has no claim for indemnity. See, e.g., Coca-Cola Bottling Co.-Goshen v. Vendo
Co.,

-

Ind. App.

-,

455 N.E.2d 370 (1983).

92. 284 S.C. at 16, 325 S.E.2d at 333.
93. Id. at 14, 325 S.E.2d at 332.
94. 282 S.C. 402, 318 S.E.2d 369 (1984).
95. Id. at 403, 318 S.E.2d at 369.
96. The majority opinion was written by Justice Ness, with Justices Littlejohn and
Harwell concurring. The dissent was written by Justice Lewis and joined by Justice
Gregory.
97. 282 S.C. at 404, 318 S.E.2d at 370. The affidavit of Colden R. Battey, Jr., attorney for plaintiffs-respondents, stated, "That upon information and belief the Defendant,
Ben Arnold Company, sells in excess of One Million Dollars of wine and liquor annually
in Beaufort County." Record at 5. The respondent asserted, "It is uncontradicted that
the Appellant's annual sales in Beaufort County total in excess of $1,000,000." Brief of
Respondent at 2. The appellant did not directly address the dollar amount of its sales,
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court and the absence of clear reasoning in the majority opinion,
Stewart offers little guidance to the practitioner. The decision
leaves ambiguous the standard by which contract rights will be
measured to determine venue.
On November 7, 1980, while employed by defendant Ben
Arnold Co, the individual defendant, James V. Wilson, Jr., was
in an automobile collision with the plaintiffs in Beaufort County.
The plaintiffs brought a negligence action against Ben Arnold in
Beaufort County. Ben Arnold, a domestic corporation engaged
in the wholesale distribution of alcoholic liquors, had its principal place of business in Richland County. The plaintiffs were all
residents of Beaufort County. 98 Venue was premised on alleged
contractual relationships between the defendant and retail liquor establishments in Beaufort County. The trial court denied
defendant's motion for a change of venue to Richland County. 99
The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed and remanded. 1°°
Section 15-7-30 of the South Carolina Code provides in
part: "In all other cases the action shall be tried in the county in

nor did it question the reliability of the respondent's estimate. Although respondent
never offered any basis for its "information and belief," the court did not question the
lack of substantiation.
98. Brief of Respondent at 1.
99. Brief of Appellant at 6. The trial court considered the following guidelines:
(1) the size, value, and specific nature of the contract must disclose a substantial interest, In re: Asbestosis Cases, [276 S.C. 579, 281 S.E.2d 112];
(2) the property interests within the county must be continuous and permanent in nature, and not transitory, Lott v. Claussen's,Inc., 251 S.C. 478, 163
S.E.2d 615 (1968); Peeples v. Orkin Exterminating Company, Inc., 244 S.C.
173, 135 S.E.2d 845 (1964); Hopkins v. Sun Crest Bottling Company, 228 S.C.
287, 89 S.E.2d 755 (1955);
(3) the requirement of permanency must be evaluated in relationship to
the necessities of the Defendant's business transactions in the county, Mathis
v. A.R. Wood Corporation,272 S.C. 388, 252 S.E.2d 131 (1979).
Id. at 6 (citing Record at 11). On the basis of these guidelines, the trial court made the
following determinations:
(1) That the pecuniary interest of Ben Arnold Company sales in Beaufort
County are substantial given that six liquor stores in Beaufort County purchased in excess of fifty (50%) percent of their stock from Ben Arnold
Company;
(2) That the permanency and continuity of Appellants contractual rights
are established by the fact that Appellant has entered into weekly contracts
with retail dealers and in one case such dealer bought liquor from Appellant
for four years.
Id. at 6 (citing Record at 11-12).
100. 282 S.C. at 404, 318 S.E.2d at 370.
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which the defendant resides at the time of the commencement
of the action."10
' 1 In In re Asbestosis Cases 02 the South Carolina

Supreme Court stated that the residence of a corporate defendant for venue purposes may be established in any of the following locations: (1) the county where it has its principal place of
business; (2) the county where it maintains an office and agent
for transacting business; or (3) the county where it owns property and transacts business. 0

3

The court had previously noted

that it had never determined the minimum standard a contract
must meet to constitute owning property within a county for
venue purposes.0 4
Although the court in In re Asbestosis Cases noted the absence of any minimum standard, it declined the opportunity to
set an exact standard. These cases, however, suggest a scale on
which other instances may be measured. In the 1981 In re Asbestosis Cases the court affirmed a finding by the trial judge
that North Brothers'0 " owned property in Barnwell County sufficient for venue purposes. 06 The court allowed venue to be based
solely on a DuPont labor contract valued at $1,000,000 annually.
This contract had been awarded to North Brothers every year
since 1965.107 By contrast, in the 1980 In re Asbestosis Cases the

court had reversed the trial court and approved a change of
venue, even though venue was premised upon the same DuPont
labor contract, at that time valued at only $900,000.108

101. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-7-30 (1976)(emphasis added).
102. 276 S.C. 579, 281 S.E.2d 112 (1981), 274 S.C. 421, 266 S.E.2d 773 (1980). These
cases involved product liability claims by individuals against North Brothers and others
for injuries allegedly sustained from exposure to asbestos insulation manufactured or
sold by the various defendants. Plaintiffs were industrial insulators employed by the defendants to perform insulation work in Barnwell County, under contracts with DuPont
Company, Barnwell Mills, and Southern Bell. The 1980 In re Asbestosis Cases included
cases consolidated from 1976 through November 29, 1978. The 1981 In re Asbestosis
Cases include cases consolidated from November 29, 1978, through July 25, 1980. These
cases were consolidated by order of the court of common pleas of Barnwell County for
pretrial purposes.
103. 276 S.C. at 582, 281 S.E.2d at 114.
104. 274 S.C. at 430, 266 S.E.2d at 777.
105. North Brothers is a distributor-supplier of insulation products and an independent contractor in the insulation trade. See supra note 102.
106. 276 S.C. at 586, 281 S.E.2d at 114.
107. Brief of Appellant at 8.
108. 274 S.C. at 429, 266 S.E.2d at 777. The dollar value of the contract from its
origination in 1965 through June 30, 1974, totalled approximately $900,000. No estimate
was given of the size of the contract after this date, although it had been renewed on a
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In Stewart the respondent contended that the appellant
transacted business in excess of $1,000,000 in Beaufort County
every year. 10 9 Thus, Stewart appears analogous to the 1981 In re
Asbestosis Cases when analyzed on the value of the underlying
contractual rights. There are, however, factual differences. While
the court in the 1981 In re Asbestosis Cases held that a single
year's performance of the DuPont labor contract would satisfy
the venue requirement,"' there were four independent, contractual grounds upon which it concluded that venue was proper."'
These collateral contractual rights generated significant additional business to North Brothers in Barnwell County."12 In
Stewart the only contractual rights in Beaufort County were the
wholesale liquor sales.
In addition, the nature of the contractual rights in the two
cases is distinguishable. North Brothers' contract obligated it to
provide insulation workers to DuPont. This contract had been
awarded to North Brothers continuously for 15 years. 1 3 Ben Arnold's contracts were simply separate, weekly contracts for the
sale of liquor." 4 The record shows only one case of an extended
contractual relationship between Ben Arnold and a retail liquor
dealer, which lasted four years." 5 The Stewart court accepted

yearly basis.
109. Record at 12.
110. 276 S.C. at 584, 281 S.E.2d at 115.
111. Brief of Appellant at 7. These four independent grounds are as follows:
(1) Contract with E.I. DuPont for installation of insulation at the Savannah River Plant, located in Aiken, Barnwell, and Allendale Counties;
(2) Contractual rights from the sale of insulation to DuPont at the Savannah River Plant;
(3) Contract with the Insulation Employees' Union for the Savannah River
Plant job;
(4) Work performed at Barnwell Mills and the Southern Bell Building in
Barnwell.
Id. at 7-8.
112. 276 S.C. at 584, 281 S.E.2d at 115. Sales of insulation materials to DuPont for
the fiscal year 1978-1979 were expected to exceed $100,000. The estimated value of insulation work to be performed for Barnwell Mills and Southern Bell was $14,000-$20,000
for 1979. In addition, DuPont paid North Brothers a fixed annual fee, which was
$125,000 through 1978 and was anticipated to be $70,000 from 1978-1980.
113. Brief of Appellant at 8.
114. Brief of Appellant at 3.
115. Record at 12. The South Carolina Supreme Court has distinguished temporary
contracts from annually renewed contracts in other venue cases. See Peeples v. Orkin
Exterminating Co., 244 S.C. 173, 135 S.E.2d 845 (1964)(holding that a contract to treat
buildings against termites upon payment of an annual renewal fee was continuous, not
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appellant's argument that distinct and separate contracts are
created with each order by a liquor store owner in Beaufort
County, 116 noting that "neither party to these transactions is obligated to continue this business relationship . ... "I"
The South Carolina Supreme Court's treatment of the
venue issue raised in Stewart leaves unanswered an important
question faced by many practitioners: when do contractual
rights become substantial and continuous enough to constitute
owning property within a county for venue purposes? The validity of the scale suggested by the In re Asbestosis Cases is unclear after Stewart, since it depends upon distinguishing Stewart as a case addressing continuity rather than substantiality. It
is clear, however, that the South Carolina Supreme Court will
strictly require both a substantial and continuous property interest in a county for venue to lie.
Marie C. Tiller

VII.

TORT RESULTING FROM MEDICAL SERVICES DEEMED TO
HAVE OCCURRED WHERE SERVICES WERE RENDERED

In Hume v. Durwood Medical Clinic, Inc."58 the South Carolina Court of Appeals evaluated the scope of the South Carolina long arm statute.11 9 The court held that where medical services are rendered outside the forum state, due process requires
that for jurisdictional purposes, the tort be deemed to have occurred where the alleged injurious act, rather than its consetemporary in nature); Brown v. Palmetto Banking Co., 220 S.C. 38, 66 S.E.2d 417 (1951).
In Brown the defendant distributed its product through salesmen and truck drivers at
wholesale outlets in the county in which the plaintiff commenced the action. The defendant maintained no agent or place of business in the county. The court held that the
deliveries by the defendant to the county did not subject the defendant to venue in that
county. See also Hopkins v. Sun Crest Bottling Co., 228 S.C. 287, 89 S.E.2d 755 (1955);
Thomas and Howard Co. of Conway v. Marion Lumber Co, 232 S.C. 304, 101 S.E.2d 848
(1948).
116. Brief of Appellant at 10.
117. 282 S.C. at 404, 318 S.E.2d at 370.
118. 282 S.C. 236, 318 S.E.2d 119 (Ct. App. 1984), cert. granted, 284 S.C. 417, 327
S.E,2d 322 (1985).
119. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-803(1)(c)(1976), the long arm statute, provides as follows: "A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person who acts directly or by an
agent as to a cause of action arising from the person's commission of a tortious act in
whole or in part in this State."
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quences, took place.' 0 This decision is in accord with the rule
121
followed in many jurisdictions.
The plaintiff, as administratrix of a South Carolina decedent, brought a wrongful death action alleging that the defendants were negligent in providing medical care to the decedent.
Hume, the decedent, was referred by his South Carolina physician to the defendants, a North Carolina corporation doing business as a medical clinic in Charlotte and two of its staff physicians. The physicians, a nephrologist and a cardiologist, treated
Hume for several years. The decedent was last examined in the
clinic on February 22, 1978; he died of a heart attack three days
122
later at his home in Union County, South Carolina.
The trial court, relying on Parker v. Williams & Madianik,
Inc.,'23 found that the defendants had committed a tortious act
in South Carolina, within the scope of the state long arm statute. "2' 4 The trial judge also concluded that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over them would not offend the constitutional
requirements of due process. 25 The defendants appealed from
the trial court's decision overruling their demurrer and denying
their motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. 26 In reversing the trial court's order, the court of appeals concluded that the defendants' conduct was within the

120. 282 S.C. at 241-43, 318 S.E.2d at 122-23.
121. See, e.g., Wright v. Yackley, 459 F.2d 287 (9th Cir. 1972);Chancellor v. Lawrence, 501 F. Supp. 997 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Glover v. Wagner, 462 F. Supp. 308 (D. Neb.
1978); Kurtz v. Draur, 434 F. Supp. 958 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Soares v. Roberts, 417 F. Supp.
304 (D.R.I. 1976); Markham v. Gray, 393 F. Supp. 1613 (W.D.N.Y. 1975); Gelineau v.
New York Univ. Hosp., 375 F. Supp. 661 (D.N.J. 1974); McAndrew v. Burnett, 374 F.
Supp. 460 (M.D. Pa. 1974); Kailieha v. Hayes, 56 Hawaii 306, 536 P.2d 568 (1975);
Woodward v. Keenan, 88 Mich. App. 791, 279 N.W.2d 317 (1979).
122. 282 S.C. at 237, 318 S.E.2d at 120.
123. 270 S.C. 570, 243 S.E.2d 451 (1978). Parker concerned a negligence action
against a nonresident architect who designed a building knowing it was to be constructed
at Hilton Head Island, South Carolina. After construction the building collapsed from
alleged design defects, causing the death of the intestate. The South Carolina Supreme
Court stated: "Generally, the place of the wrong is determined where the last event
necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes place, or, as otherwise stated,
the place where the injury is suffered *rather
than the place where the act which caused
the injury was committed." Id. at 574, 243 S.E.2d at 454 (emphasis added)(quoting 86
C.J.S. Torts § 25 (1954)).
124. 282 S.C. at 238-39, 318 S.E.2d at 120.
125. Id. at 239, 318 S.E.2d at 121.
126. Id., 318 S.E.2d at 120.
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scope of the state long arm statute,12 7 but held that the assertion
of jurisdiction over them would be "unreasonable under the
28
circumstances."1
Appellants sought to distinguish Parker from the instant
case by the nature of the services performed. 2 ' In Parker the
defendant architect purposefully placed his product into the
stream of commerce knowing it was ultimately destined for the
forum state. 130 In contrast, medical services, appellants maintained, "are directed at no place but to the needy person himself. It is the very nature of such services that their conse3
quences will be felt wherever the person may choose to go.' '
The court of appeals adopted the analysis employed by the
Ninth Circuit in Wright v. Yackley, 3 2 the authority relied upon

127. Id. at 241, 318 S.E.2d at 122. The court of appeals found some evidence that
the defendants attempted to provide treatment to the decedent by mail, thus bringing
their conduct within the scope of the long arm statute. From the transcript it appears
that the defendants mailed the decedent's bills to South Carolina, corresponded by mail
with the decedent's family physician in South Carolina, provided copies of the decedent's medical records to his family physician in South Carolina, and made recommendations for general follow-up treatment to be carried out in South Carolina. Record at 17,
31, 32. Conceivably, none of these actions constitute diagnosis or treatment by mail, but
rather mere confirmatory matters as in Wright v. Yackley, 459 F.2d 287 (9th Cir. 1972).
It would have been possible, therefore, for the court to hold that the defendant's actions
were not within the scope of the South Carolina long arm statute.
128. Id. at 243, 318 S.E.2d at 123. The South Carolina long arm statute has consistently been interpreted as granting jurisdiction commensurate with the broadest limits of
due process. See, e.g., Bass v. Harbor Light Marina, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 786 (D.S.C. 1974);
Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 703 (D.S.C. 1971); Deering Milliken
Research Corp. v. Textured Fibres, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 491 (D.S.C. 1970). It is possible to
infer from the court's analysis that the South Carolina long arm statute is unconstitutional because it encompasses the defendant's activities, but its application to the defendant would violate due process. It was probably not the court's intent, however, to imply
that the statute is unconstitutional. In practice, an overinclusive long arm statute will
have little effect since courts will decline jurisdiction on due process grounds when
necessary.
129. Brief of Appellants at 11.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 12.
132. 459 F.2d 287 (9th Cir. 1972). Wright was also a medical malpractice action. An
Idaho resident instituted suit against a South Dakota physician for injuries allegedly
sustained from the use of drugs prescribed by the defendant. The plaintiff was a patient
of the defendant's in South Dakota when she obtained the original prescription. She
later moved to Idaho and requested a copy of that prescription. The plaintiff used the
copy to obtain the drugs in Idaho and allegedly suffered injury there from the drugs. The
court stated that if the physician was guilty of malpractice at all, it was through the
diagnosis and prescription given in South Dakota. The court held that mailing copies of
an earlier prescription to another state did not constitute a new prescription and was not
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by the appellant. The court stated, "By providing services to
Hume, the appellants were merely fulfilling their professional responsibilities to provide medical services to a patient in need,
and should not by so doing automatically subject themselves to
the jurisdiction of the courts of this state.' 13 3 While the Hume
holding is limited to the rendering of medical services, the court
did not expressly preclude the application of its reasoning to the
performance of other professional services. It is questionable,
however, whether the reasoning would be extended further given
34
the distinction of Parker.1
The court of appeals also noted that Wright distinguished
the situation where a person ventures into a foreign state to receive medical treatment and suffers injurious consequences after
returning home from the situation where a nonresident physician diagnoses and treats a patient by mail. The latter circumstances would permit jurisdiction to be invoked over the nonresident physician; the former would not.3 5 Jurisdiction based
solely on confirmatory mailings of prescriptions and medical
records, however, would not provide the minimum contact necessary to satisfy due process requirements 1 36 and "would have a
chilling effect on the availability of professional services to non' 37
residents.'

diagnosis and treatment by mail; therefore, no tort was committed within the state of
Idaho that would fall within the scope of the Idaho long arm statute. The case was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.
133. 282 S.C. at 243, 318 S.E.2d at 123.
134. See, e.g., Coopers & Lybrand v. Cocklereece, 157 Ga. App. 240, 276 S.E.2d 845
(1981). There plaintiff sued a nonresident accounting firm for allegedly placing into th3
stream of commerce an audit report containing false or misleading information. The
court did not extend personal jurisdiction over the defendants who, it felt, did not purposefully avail themselves of the privileges and benefits of Georgia Law. See also Modern Globe, Inc. v. Spellman, 45 N.C. App. 618, 263 S.E.2d 859 (1980). In this case plaintiff corporation brought suit to terminate its rights and duties under a contract with the
nonresident defendant to provide consulting and advisory services in the forum state.
The court dismissed the suit for want of personal jurisdiction, holding that neither the
contract nor the activities provided sufficient minimum contacts to satisfy the requirements of due process.
135. 282 S.C. at 241, 318 S.E.2d at 122.
136. Wright, 459 F.2d at 289.
137. Brief of Appellant at 24 (citing Gelineau v. New York Univ., 375 F. Supp. 661,
667 (D.N.J. 1974)). In Gelineau, a case similar to Hume, the court stated:
Here, as we have found, New York University Hospital has not purposefully
availed itself of the privileges of conducting activities within the forum state.
The medical services that it provided to the plaintiff were performed in New
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In Hume the South Carolina Court of Appeals carved out a
clear exception to the general rule that an alleged tort is deemed
to have occurred where the injury takes place. This decision
aligns South Carolina with the majority of states.
Marie C. Tiller

VIII.

SPECIAL REFEREE'S FINAL JUDGEMENT APPEALABLE ONLY
TO CIRCUIT COURT

In Luck v. Pencar,Ltd.13 and Boardman v. Lovett Enterprises,'3" the South Carolina Court of Appeals 140 established
that an appeal from any final judgment by a special referee must
be to the circuit court that appointed that referee. In Luck the
plaintiff and defendants had agreed that a special referee would
hear the matter' 4 1 and his ruling would be final, with all rights
of appeal directly to the South Carolina Supreme Court. 142 In
Boardman the court ordered the case 143 to a special referee and
the parties stipulated that the referee's report would be a final
44
order, with the right of appeal directly to the supreme court.1
Both cases were appealed to the supreme court, which trans4
ferred the cases 145 to the court of appeals. 1
The court of appeals noted that the trial record in Luck did

York at the request of the plaintiff who unilaterally traveled to New York to
receive them. The residence of the plaintiff herein was, and is now irrelevant to
the services provided by this defendant at its location.
375 F. Supp. at 668.
138. 282 S.C. 643, 320 S.E.2d 711 (Ct. App. 1984).
139. S.C. -,
323 S.E.2d 784 (Ct. App. 1984).
140. The case was transferred to the court of appeals pursuant to S.C. CODE ANN. §
14-8-260 (Supp. 1984), which provides in part: "Cases, including those filed before the
creation of the Court [of Appeals], shall be either transferred to the Court of Appeals or
retained by the Supreme Court."
141. Luck sought foreclosure of a mortgage given by Pencar, Ltd. and Le Huguenot,
Ltd. because of untimely interest payments. Record at 1.
142. Id.
143. Boardman had brought suit in his capacity as a limited partner in the Woodland Apartments, Ltd. against Lovett Enters., the corporate general partner of the limited partnership. Boardman sought an accounting and sued for fraud, waste, and breach
of fiduciary duty. Record at 3.
144. Id.
145. See supra note 140.
146. 282 S.C. at 644, 320 S.E.2d at 711; S.C. at _
323 S.E.2d at 785.
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not indicate the issuance of any order appointing the special referee, nor did it reveal the legal authority under which the referee
acted. Assuming, however, that the special referee was regularly
appointed, 147 the court held that section 14-11-90 of the South
Carolina Code 148 applied only to a final judgment issued by a
149
master, not to a final judgment entered by a special referee.
Although sections 14-11-6150 and 15-31-150'11 grant all the powers and authority of a master to a special referee appointed by a
judge, the right of appeal is not a power given to a master but a
right conferred upon a party. An appeal from any final judgment
entered by a special referee, therefore, could not be taken directly to either the supreme court or the court of appeals, but
only to the circuit court.' 52 The court of appeals applied this
5
same holding in Boardman. 3
Both decisions clearly establish that an appeal cannot be
taken to either the supreme court or the court of appeals from
any final judgment entered by a special referee.
Richard K. Warther
IX.

TRIAL JUDGE'S RIGHT TO GRANT NEW TRIAL NISI ADDITUR

AFFIRMED

In Graham v. Whitaker 5

1

the South Carolina Supreme

147. 282 S.C. at 644, 370 S.E.2d at 712. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-31-40 (Supp. 1984)

requires a reference to be made to a master in all counties. The attorney general, however, has stated that special references may be appointed on a case by case basis, notwithstanding § 15-31-40. 1984 Op. S.C. Att'y Gen. 129, No. 84-52.
148. S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-11-90 (Supp. 1984) states in part that "[a]ppeals from final
judgments entered by a master pursuant to § 15-31-10 shall be to the circuit court unless
otherwise directed by order of the circuit court or by consent of the parties." The court
of appeals noted that the language of the statute was clear and unambiguous and must
be held to mean what it plainly says: a direct appeal to the supreme court or court of
appeals is permitted from a final judgment entered by a master. 282 S.C. at 645, 320
S.E.2d at 912. See Jones v. S.C. State Highway Dep't, 247 S.C. 132, 146 S.E.2d 166
(1966); McCollum v. Snipes, 213 S.C. 254, 49 S.E.2d 12 (1948).
149. 282 S.C. at 645, 320 S.E.2d at 712.
150. S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-11-60 (Supp. 1984) states that "a special referee ... shall
...be clothed with all the powers of a master."
151. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-31-150 (Supp. 1984) provides that "[s]pecial referees shall

have the same authority as masters-in-equity and shall be accountable to the appointing
court."
152. 282 S.C. at 645-46, 320 S.E.2d at 712.
153.

-

S.C. at -, 323 S.E.2d at 786.

154. 282 S.C. 393, 321 S.E.2d 40 (1984).
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Court affirmed the right of a trial judge in South Carolina to
grant a motion for new trial nisi additur,1 55 provided that he
gives the defendant a clear choice of either paying additional
damages or submitting to a new trial on the damages issue. After
the jury had awarded the plaintiff, Mrs. Graham, $10,000 actual
damages and $10,000 punitive damages, the trial judge granted
plaintiff's motion and ordered that a new trial be conducted,
limited to the issue of damages, unless the defendant, Dr. Whitaker, agreed to pay an additional $67,500 to the plaintiff. The
South Carolina Supreme Court, citing Middleton v. Atlantic
Coast Line 56 and Toole v. Toole, 5 7 held that a trial judge's
power to order a new trial under section 15-27-150 of the South
Carolina Code 1 8 is broad enough to encompass the authority to
order a new trial nisi additur,as well as a new trial nisi remittitur. The court further held that the trial judge had not abused
his discretion by ordering a new trial nisi additur in this case,
especially in light of the obvious inadequacy of the damages
when compared to the plaintiff's injuries.
Sylvia Ann Matthews
X.

RIGHT TO PERSONAL SERVICE OF PROCESS CAN BE WAIVED

In Myrtle Beach Lumber Co. v. Globe International
Corp.1 9 the South Carolina Court of Appeals reinstated a default judgment against the defendants,1 60 even though the defen155. Additur is "[t]he power of the trial court to assess damages or increase amount
of an inadequate award made by jury verdict, as condition of denial of motion for new
trial, with consent of defendant whether or not plaintiff consents to such action."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 36 (5th ed. 1979). Its use is prohibited in federal courts as
violative of the seventh amendment right to a trial by jury. Because the seventh amendment has not been applied to the states, individual states may permit its use in their
court systems. An argument could be made, however, that its use in South Carolina violates S.C. CONsT. art. I § 14 and art. V § 17. See generally H. LIGHTSEY & J. FLANAGAN,
SOUTH CAROLINA CIVIL PROCEDURE (1984).
156. 133 S.C. 23, 130 S.E. 552 (1925).
157. 260 S.C. 235, 195 S.E.2d 389 (1973).
158. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-27-150 (1976). This section provides: "Circuit courts may
grant new trials in cases in which there has been a trial by jury. Such new trials may be
granted for reasons for which new trials have usually been granted in the courts of law of
this State."
159. 281 S.C. 290, 315 S.E.2d 142 (Ct. App. 1984).
160. The defendants in the action were Globe International Corporation and its
owners and operators Richard D. and Ada D. Helms, who had executed the contract that
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dants had not been personally served with a summons, as required under section 15-9-20 of the South Carolina Code. 161 The

defendants had authorized their attorney to accept service of
process on their behalf, and the summons was actually served on
him. The court held that the defendants had effectively waived
the requirement of personal service and had made their attorney
their agent for the purpose of process service. This exception to
the statutory requirement of personal service should not be read
too broadly. The court's opinion suggested that such waiver by
consent would be limited to situations in which the defendant
has actual notice of the pending litigation and has expressly authorized an agent to accept service. The court also stressed the
fact that the agent in this case was the clients' attorney and that
an attorney is the "alter ego of his client."' 2
Sylvia Ann Matthews

was the subject of the litigation.
161. S.C. CODE ANN.§ 15-9-520 (1976). This section directs that service be made to a
party's attorney, rather than to the party himself, but applies only to service made after
the commencement of an action and not to the service of a summons. S.C. CODE ANN. §
15-9-210 (Supp. 1984) permits service of process to a corporation to be delivered to a
corporation's agent, but only when that agent is registered to receive service on the corporation's behalf.
162. 281 S.C. at 292, 315 S.E.2d at 143.
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